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ANTITRUST LAW: AN EMERGING PROBLEM FOR
FLORIDA REALTORS
People of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment
and diversion, but that the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the
public or in some contrivance to raise prices."
-Adam Smith
Despite relatively early enactment of the Sherman Antitrust Act 2 and a
similar Florida statute,3 there have been few federal and no Florida court
decisions construing these laws as applied to the activities of real estate trade
associations and their members. In a shift of enforcement emphasis, however,
the Attorney General of the United States recently filed several civil antitrust
4
actions against metropolitan real estate boards.
In the initial action a federal district court issued a consent decree enjoining the Prince George's County Board of Realtors, unilaterally or in
agreement with others, from certain practices, including the fixing of commission rates.5 These recent federal government antitrust actions and a subsequent private class action6 may portend antitrust enforcement affecting
Florida real estate trade associations and their members. The provisions of
the consent decree in United States v. Prince George's County Board of Realtors, Inc.,7 if applicable, would alter relationships among Florida real estate

trade associations, their members, nonmember brokers and salesmen, and
clients. Moreover, since the private class action alleges violation of state as
well as of federal antitrust laws s it suggests the potential application of Florida antitrust statutes to real estate trade associations and members.
This note will analyze the impact of Prince George's County Board of
Realtors and similar actions on the operations of Florida realtors, focusing on

1. 1 A. SMrH, WEALTH OF NATIONS 117 (1910); "[T]rade associations in bringing competitors together undeniably offer a means by which collusive action in violation of the
antitrust laws may be undertaken." S. OPPENHEIM & G. WESTON, FEDERAL ANTrrRUST LAWS
144 (3d ed. 1968).
2. 15 U.S.C. §§1-7 (1970) (originally enacted in 1890).
3. FIA. STAT. ch. 542 (1969) (originally enacted in 1915).
4. Complaint, United States v. Atlanta Real Estate Bd., Civil No. 14744 (N.D. Ga., filed
Feb. 17, 1971); Complaint, United States v. Los Angeles Realty Bd., Civil No. 70-2855-CC
(C.D. Cal., filed Dec. 18, 1970); Complaint, United States v. Long Island Bd. of Realtors,
Inc., Civil No. 70 C 1418 (E.D.N.Y., filed Nov. 17, 1970); Complaint, United States v.
Cleveland Real Estate Bd., Civil No. C 70.731 (N.D. Ohio, filed July 29, 1970); Complaint,
United States v. Prince George's County Bd. of Realtors, Inc., Civil No. 21545 (D. Md.,
filed Dec. 18, 1969).
5. Consent decree, United States v. Prince George's County Bd. of Realtors, Inc., Civil
No. 21545 (D. Md., entered Dec. 28, 1970).
6. Amended complaint, Kline v. CoIdwell, Banker & Co., Realtors, Civil No. 70-2127WPG (C.D. Cal., filed March 18, 1971).
7. Civil No. 21545 (D. Md., entered Dec. 28, 1970).
8. Amended complaint, Kline v. Coldwell, Banker & Co., Realtors, Civil No. 70-2127WPG (C.D. Cal., filed March 18, 1971).
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the organization of real estate trade associations, the thrust of the recent
federal antitrust actions, and the major questions raised by application of the
Sherman Act to real estate activities. Additionally, associational restraints of
trade and remedies for Sherman Act violations will be considered. After reviewing the potential effect of Florida antitrust law, the note will examine
alternatives to present practices by real estate trade associations and members,
as well as alternatives for clients.
REAL ESTATE TRADE ASSOCIATIONS

The dominant trade organization of real estate brokers and salesmen is
the National Association of Real Estate Boards, with state and local affiliates.
The great number of members, 9 economic strength, and the relationship of
real estate activities to community affairs vest massive power in the Association.10 Operating under the National Association, state organizations such as
the Florida Association of Realtors unite local boards of realtors and coordinate association programs and ethics.1 ' Local boards coordinate trade association activities and provide services for member "realtors."'12 Since members
of local boards are also members of national and state associations, 3 they
benefit from national and regional advertising extolling their competence
and integrity.4 At the city and county levels local boards provide educational programs, appraisal services, arbitration facilities, ethics counseling,
disciplinary procedures' 5 and multiple listing systems.' 6
A multiple listing system is an arrangement between real estate brokers
in a given area authorizing a member broker to sell property exclusively listed
with any other member. All listings are registered with a central exchange
and disseminated to other members for information and possible sales. When
a listed property is sold by a member other than the listing broker the sales

9. Austin, Real Estate Boards and Multiple Listing Systems as Restraints of Trade, 70
CoLum. L. REy. 1325, 1326 (1970); Gainesville (Fla.) Sun, May 23, 1971 (classified Supplement, Realtor Week) at 9 (18,200 members of Florida Ass'n of Realtors).
10. Austin, supra note 9, at 1327-28.
11. Florida Ass'n of Realtors, Charter, art. I, §1 (1971).
12. W. HusBAND & F. ANDERSON, REAL EsrATE 327 (rev. ed. 1954). The term "realtor" is

the copyrighted property of the National Association of Real Estate Bds., serving as an
indication of association membership and a public relations symbol. Austin, supra note 9,
at 1328.
13. See Gainesville (Fla.) Bd. of Realtors, Bylaws, art. X, §2. See also Florida Ass'n of
Realtors, Charter, art. I, §2 (1971).
14. Austin, supra note 9, at 1328.

15. In considering disciplinary action by the Professional Ethics Committee of a Florida
chapter of the American Institute of Real Estate Appraisers, which, like the National Association of Real Estate Boards is a trade association of personnel engaged in real estate
activities, the Florida supreme court recently held that such an organization was bound
to observe due process in its disciplinary proceedings. McCune v. Wilson, 237 So. 2d 169
(Fla. 1970).
16. Austin, supra note 9, at 1328.
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commission is divided among the selling broker, the listing broker, and the
central registration office.Y7
Local boards control most multiple listing systems either directly or indirectly. 8 This control stems from early recognition of the advantages of
multiple listing systems and the power of the local board to regulate them.
Multiple listing benefits sellers and buyers by increasing the effectiveness
of the real estate market, thereby making realty a more salable commodity.' 9
Increased market effectiveness benefits the public by dampening price fluctuations and providing higher utilization through faster turnover of real
estate. Each trade association member benefits by access to an increased number of listings and receives broader circulation for his own listings.
Some multiple listing systems base charges on the cost of the services provided to their members;20 others charge a percentage of each sale commission.
One system distributed five per cent of the commission to the system, seventyfive per cent of the remainder to the selling broker, and the balance to the
listing broker.21 Another system charges four per cent of the commission and
allots seventy-five per cent of the remainder to the selling broker if a member
22
of the system, but only fifty per cent if he is a nonmember.
The system's power to discriminate against the nonmember seller derives
from members' use of exclusive listings.23 Under an exclusive listing the listing
broker receives a commission regardless of who sells the property. 24 Where the
listing broker is a system member, the system bylaws control distribution of
the commission on sales of the exclusively listed property.2 5
Multiple listing system membership is restricted by required compliance
with qualifications imposed by the Florida Real Estate Commission 20 and real
estate trade associations. The Commission requires a candidate seeking registration as a real estate salesman to meet residency and character standards
17. See Frisell v. Newman, 71 Wash. 2d 520, 527, 429 P.2d 864, 868 (1967).
18. Austin, supra note 9, at 1328-29.
19. Id. at 1329.
20. In addition to a fixed monthly fee of $7 per member brokerage office, one system
charges a listing broker $10 each time he lists a property. If he sells the property he pays
an additional $2; if another member sells the property the listing broker pays the same $2
fee and the selling broker pays a single fee equal to the two fees paid by the listing broker.
Evanston-North Shore Bd. of Realtors v. United States, 320 F.2d 375, 377 (Ct. Cl. 1963).
21. Grillo v. Board of Realtors, 91 N.J. Super. 202, 209, 219 A.2d 635, 639 (Super.
Ct. 1966).

22. Gainesville (Fla.) Multiple Listing, Inc., Bylaws, art. XVII, §3 (1967).
23. "The exclusive listing of property should be urged and practiced by the Realtor
as a means of preventing dissension and misunderstanding and of assuring better service
to the owner." National Ass'n of Real Estate Bds., Code of Ethics, art. 15 (1962).
24.

F. CASE, REAL ESTATE BROKERAGE 140 (1965).

25. Complaint, United States v. Cleveland Real Estate Bd., Civil No. C 70.731 (N.D.
Ohio, filed July 29, 1970) (Attorney General alleged conspiracy to adhere to exclusive
listings to discourage sales by-passing members' commissions); Gainesville (Fla.) Multiple
Listings Inc., Bylaws, art. XVII, §§5, 6 (1967).
26. The Florida Real Estate Commission consists of three members, each of whose vocation for at least ten years prior to his appointment shall have been that of a real estate
broker. FLA. STAT. §475.02 (1969).
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and to pass prescribed courses and a state examination. 2 7 A broker candidate,
after twelve months experience as a registered salesman, must show evidence
of good character, competency in handling real estate transactions, and satisfactory completion of prescribed courses and a state examination. 28 Membership in a typical board of realtors entails a minimum of six months service
as a broker in the board's locale and approval by eighty per cent of the
membership. 29 Since only members of the local board can become members of
the multiple listing system, 3° a broker may enjoy the benefits of multiple
listing system membership only after he surmounts trade association barriers
beyond prerequisites for state registration.
Just as real estate boards or multiple listing systems prescribe the apportionment of sales commissions, local boards prescribe or suggest over-all
commission rates. 31 A 1954 textbook states that brokers in most areas have tried
to standardize commission rates at five per cent.3 2 A schedule of commission
rates published by a board of realtors in 1968 suggests a commission rate of
six per cent on improved and suburban property.33 The higher commission
rate, compounded by rising real estate prices, raises questions as to whether
the realtor's services are overpriced. 34
RECENT FEDERAL ANTITRUST ACTION

The 1954 realtor's textbook adds that, while custom will usually favor
the use of a standardized schedule of commissions, it should be stressed that

27.

§§475.17-.19 (1969).
§475.17 (1969).

28.

FLA. STAT.
FLA. STAT.

29.

"Any . . . broker . . . who has been established in the real estate business for a

minimum of six (6) months immediately prior to making application, maintaining an office
in the [local area] ... shall be eligible for Realtor Membership." Orlando-Winter Park
(Fla.) Bd. of Realtors, Bylaws, art. III (1967). "The Executive Committee shall be bound
to reject the application if twenty per cent (20%) of the Realtors object. If an applicant
has been rejected... the applicant may not reapply for... a period of six months ...
Id. art. IV.
30. Gainesville (Fla.) Multiple Listing, Inc., Bylaws, art. V (1967).
31. "Offices normally follow the commission schedules recommended by the local real
estate board .... Cutting commissions for any reason is usually discouraged .... A firm
statement that the commission will be based on a printed schedule will usually discourage
buyers and sellers from asking for cuts in the rate." F. CASE, REAL ESTATE BROKERAGE 179
(1965); "The broker's commissions are fixed by a schedule of charges promulgated by the
Board of Realtors ... ."E.ZEPP, REAL ESrATE PRACrInc IN PENNSYLVANiA 280 (1957); "Sales
commissions, collection fees and other fees for specific services are usually published in the
Board's rules of practice. Infraction of these rules, either as to over-charges via exorbitant
fees or unethical conduct between broker and clients, are cause for discipline before the
Ethics and Grievance Committee of the Board ... " E. ZEmP, id. at 64.
32. W. HUSBAND & F. ANDERSON, supra note 12, at 329.
33. Gainesville (Fla.) Bd.of Realtors, Suggested Commission Rates (May 1, 1968).
34. "[T]his column questioned the large commissions earned by real estate agents
for doing relatively little work." Roberts, A Home-Grown Author and Pure-of-Heart
Pranking, The National Observer, July 26, 1971, at 11, col. 5.
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any agreement among brokers as to commissions violates antitrust law. 5 The
text seems prophetic in light of recent governmental action at the federal
level.
In Prince George's County Board of Realtors, Inc.,3 6 the Attorney General
alleged that the Board and its members had for many years conspired to raise
and fix commission rates in accordance with published schedules. The complaint stated that the multiple listing service operated by the Board would not
accept listings at lesser commissions, resulting in an increase in rates to an
artificial and noncompetitive level and elimination of price competition
among the co-conspirator brokers and salesmen. The complaint further alleged that the Board's actions had denied sellers the right to choose realtors
according to competitively determined commission rates.
The subsequent consent decree enjoined the Board and its members from
publishing or suggesting any recommended commission rates and ordered the
Board to insert in its contracts a provision that rates be negotiable between the
broker and client37 Although the complaint did not mention the fixing of
any percentage division of commissions between the selling and listing broker,
the consent decree enjoined this practice, as well as proscribing membership
fees unrelated to the cost of services furnished members by the Board or its
multiple listing service3 8 In addition to enjoining the association from fixing
the commission apportionment between the selling and listing brokers, the decree enjoined the Board from restricting the right to seek a commission in
accordance with a dealer's own business judgment.3 9 Finally, the decree forbade
boycotting or otherwise refusing to do business with any person.4 0
Although the decree provides that commission rates be negotiable between
broker and client, it is silent as to the client's role in negotiating the commission apportionment between the selling and listing brokers. The decree
enjoins the Board from refusing to do business with any person, but it does
not specify whether a seller may deal directly with a multiple listing system
to avoid apportionment of the commission to a listing broker.
APPLICATION OF SHERMAN

ACT -

SECTION 1

In a federal action, such as Prince George's County Board of Realtors,
three elements of proof are required for convicting a board of realtors of
violating section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act. The Government must

35. W. HUSBAND & F. ANDERSON, supra note 12, at 330.
36. Civil No. 21545 (D. Md., filed Dec. 18, 1969).
37. Consent decree, United States v. Prince George's County Bd. of Realtors, Inc., Civil
No. 21545 (D. Md., entered Dec. 28, 1970).
38. Although neither the complaint nor consent decree in this case provided information about the multiple listing system membership fees, a system in New Jersey required
payment of $1,000 dollars as an initiation fee. Grillo v. Board of Realtors, 91 N.J. Super.
202, 209, 219 A.2d 635, 639 (Super. Ct. 1966).
39. Consent decree, United States v. Prince George's County Bd. of Realtors, Inc., Civil
No. 21545 (D. Md., entered Dec. 28, 1970).
40. Id.
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show that the activities of the board and members are categorized as a trade
for purposes of this section. It must persuade the court that the alleged activiand it
ties fall within the federal power to regulate interstate commerce,
41
trade.
of
restraint
in
conspiracy
or
combination
a
must prove
Trade
42
In United States v. National Association of Real Estate Boards the Supreme Court held that the services of a real estate agent are included in the
word "trade" for purposes of application of the Sherman Antitrust Act to
federal territories. 43 The Court stated that the Act was aimed at combinations organized to control the market by suppression of competition in the
marketing of goods and services. 44 "Trade" is used in the Sherman Act in a
broad sense.45 Neither the wording of the commerce and federal territory sections of the Act nor its construction in National Association of Real Estate
Boards indicates a narrow definition of "trade."4 6 Both precedent and policy
be categorized as a "trade" under the
indicate that real estate brokerage should
47
commerce section of the Sherman Act.

Commerce Among the Several States
Whether the activities of real estate associations and their members are
"commerce among the states" is a critical question, as yet unanswered by the
Supreme Court.48 Some precedent exists for considering the real estate business as strictly intrastate.49 In a private federal action, Cotillion Club, Inc. v.
Detroit Real Estate Board,50 plaintiffs pointed to certain aspects of real
estate activities, such as transmitting documents out of state, as a basis for
jurisdiction under federal antitrust laws. 51 In granting defendants' motion to

41. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §1 (1970).

42. 339 U.S. 485 (1950).
43. See Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §3 (1970).
44. United States v. National Ass'n of Real Estate Bds., 339 U.S. 485, 490 (1950).
45. Id. at 491.

46. Austin, supra note 9, at 1332.
47. Id.
48. In United States v. National Ass'n of Real Estate Bds. the Court stated: "[W]e are
concerned here not with interstate commerce but iwith trade or commerce in the District
of Columbia." 339 U.S. 485, 492 (1950).
49. "Perhaps the most obvious activities which are usually beyond the effective reach
of federal law are those involving the local rendition of services, such as laundries, dry
cleaning establishments, barber shops, building trades, mechanical repair, scavengers, funeral
directors, caterers, employment agencies, and real estate brokers." Rail, Toward a Worthwhile State Antitrust Policy, 39 TExAs L. REV. 753, 759 (1961) (emphasis added).
50. 303 F. Supp. 850 (E.D. Mich. 1964).
51. "The allegations of the amended complaint are that some members of the defend-

ants receive and transmit information and listings to and from other states; that some
members of the defendants make and file applications, reports, and other documents for

transmittal to Washington, D.C. or other out-of-state offices of various Federal Housing
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dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, the court stated that such incidental activities
across state lines do not establish federal jurisdiction. The court indicated
that the critical question is whether the alleged restraints are operative in
interstate commerce, and not whether defendants' members engage, in the
52 total conduct of their business, in incidental activities across state lines.
Citing Cotillion Club, a federal district court dismissed a class action in which
university students sought an injunction and treble damages for alleged rent
53
fixing in violation of the interstate commerce section of the Sherman Act.

Despite the holding of Cotillion Club, recent federal antitrust actions list
a variety of interstate activities as bases for federal jurisdiction. To support
his interstate commerce contention in Prince George's County Board of
Realtors5 4 the Attorney General alleged the following facts: the number of

parcels of real estate and the value thereof were substantial; 55 numerous persons using board services moved to the Board's locality from outside the state;
Board members sought to attract buyers from other states; sales involved persons from other states; advertising by Board members in out-of-state newspapers was intended to and did affect interstate movement of persons; and
Board members assisted clients in securing financing and property and title
insurance from sources outside the state.
Other contentions supporting the view that realtors' activities are "commerce" are that substantial funds flow into the state as secondary mortgage
money as a result of board members' sales;5 6 that board members cause various
instruments to move between the states and assist in securing interstate commodities and services in addition to financing and insurance; 57 and that board
Agencies; and that some members of the defendants make investigations, appraisals and
surveys of federally financed or insured Michigan real estate to be transmitted to other
states." Id. at 853.
52. Id.
53. The court rejected plaintiffs' arguments for federal jurisdiction based on interstate
movement of construction materials used in the apartment buildings and movement of
nonresident students to attend the university. Marston v. Ann Arbor Property Managers Ass'n,
302 F. Supp. 1276, 1279-80 (E.D. Mich. 1969), aff'd, 422 F.2d 836 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 399
U.S. 929 (1970).
54. Civil No. 21545 (D. Md., filed Dec. 18, 1969).
55. The magnitude of the commissions involved in the recent government actions is
indicated by the alleged value of annual sales by members of the five boards, totaling in
the five complaints more than $1.5 billion and involving more than 8,600 brokers, salesmen, and other members. Complaint, United States v. Atlantic Real Estate Bd., Civil No.
14744 (N.D. Ga., filed Feb. 17, 1971) (950 members, $257 million sales in 1969); Complaint,
United States v. Los Angeles Realty Bd., Civil No. 70-2855-CC (C.D. Cal., filed Dec. 18,
1970) (4,822 members, $600 million sales in 1969); Complaint, United States v. Long Island
Bd. of Realtors, Inc., Civil No. 70 C 1418 (E.D.N.Y., filed Nov. 17, 1970) (1,300 members,
$100 million sales in 1969); Complaint, United States v. Cleveland Real Estate Bd., Civil No.
C 70.731 (N.D. Ohio, filed July 29, 1970) (560 members, $581 million sales in 1969); Complaint, United States v. Prince George's County Bd. of Realtors, Inc., Civil No. 21545 (D.
Md., filed Dec. 18, 1969) (1,000 members, $39 million sales in 1968).
56. Complaint, United States v. Cleveland Real Estate Bd., Civil No. C 70.731 (N.D.
Ohio, filed July 29, 1970).
57. Complaint, United States v. Atlanta Real Estate Bd., Civil No. 14744 (N.D. Ga., filed
Feb. 17, 1971).
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members' commissions affect the financing of materials, supplies, and machinery moving from outside the state for use in residential and commercial
58
construction in the state.
Contrary to the categorization by Cotillion Club of real estate brokerage
activity as intrastate, other authorities support an opposite conclusion. In
National Labor Relations Board v. Jones &cLaughlin Steel Corp.59 the Supreme Court held that the commerce power embraces activities, however local
in inception, which have an impact upon interstate commerce. 60
In evaluating the significance of the interstate aspects of real estate sales,
the issue is "whether the effect is sufficiently substantial and adverse to Congress' paramount policy declared in the Act's terms to constitute a forbidden
consequence." 61 "Substantial" is interpreted in light of the particular activity's
threatened disturbance of the national economic processes. For example, a
"substantial effect" might occur when real estate buyers crossing state lines are
deprived of an opportunity to purchase property in a market uniformly available through trade association members and nonmembers.2 When prices are
fixed in other trades the courts have conclusively presumed substantial effects
on interstate commerce. 63 It is probable that the principle that "commerce
among the states is not a technical legal conception, but a practical one,
drawn from the course of business" 64 will influence the decision as to whether
the federal commerce power embraces real estate activities.- 5 This principle
may dictate that, despite the local nature of the activity, its effect on national
needs and economics and its interstate aspects may properly bring it within the
federal domain.66

58. Id.

59. 501 U.S. 1 (1936).
60. E.g., United States v. Pennsylvania Refuse Removal Ass'n, 357 F.2d 806 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 884 U.S. 961 (1966) (business including interstate as well as intrastate activities
is within flow of interstate commerce); Las Vegas Merchant Plumbers Ass'n v. United
States, 210 F.2d 752, 739 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 848 U.S. 817, rehearing denied, 348 U.S.
889 (1954) (acts are characterized as interstate commerce because they either occur in
commerce or occur on a state level with substantial effect on interstate commerce).
61. Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 234
(1948).
62. Austin, Real Estate Boards and Multiple Listing Systems as Restraints of Trade, 70
CoLuM. L. REv. 1325, 1334 (1970).
63. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 218 (1940); e.g., Las Vegas
Merchant Plumbers Ass'n v. United States, 210 F.2d 732 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 817,
rehearing denied, 348 U.S. 889 (1954) (conspiring to fix prices is conclusively presumed to
affect interstate commerce as a matter of law).
64. Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 398 (1905).
65. E.g., Order, United States v. Long Island Bd. of Realtors, Inc., Civil No. 70 C
1418 (E.D.N.Y., filed Feb. 18, 1971) (denied motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction).
66. E.g., Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 495 (1940) (Congress left no area of
its constitutional powers unoccupied); Bratcher v. Akron Area Bd. of Realtors, 381 F.2d
723 (6th Cir. 1967) (restraint of interstate movement of persons, mortgage financing, and
building materials impedes interstate commerce). See also Austin, supra note 62, at 1335-36.
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The Justice Department, after establishing that the alleged real estate
activities fall within federal jurisdiction, must prove the existence of a
combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade. Evidence of a written or oral
agreement would seemingly establish the basis for such an inference. However,
the Supreme Court in an action seeking to establish that motion picture producers and distributors had conspired to restrict "first-run" pictures to downtown theaters, indicated that proof of parallel business behavior does not conclusively establish agreement constituting a Sherman Act offense. 67 Thus, in
the absence of other adverse evidence, the fact that all members of a local real
estate board charge the same percentage commission apparently would not
alone support a finding of a conspiracy to fix prices.
The final judgment in Prince George's County Board of Realtors not only
condemns agreements between realtors but also requires that commission
rates be negotiable between broker and client. 6 If an individual broker, independent of any conspiracy with a trade association or other broker, fixes a
given per cent of sale price as commission for all residential real estate that
he sells, his action would appear to violate the above order. However, such
action quite possibly does not violate the Sherman Act.
In determining whether an agreement is in restraint of trade, the Supreme
Court has developed two alternative rules- the rule of reason and the per
se rule. Satisfaction of either is a basis for federal jurisdiction. In Chicago
Board of Trade v. United States6 9 the Court set forth the rule of reason to
determine whether the restraint merely regulates or potentially suppresses or
destroys competition.70 A court may apply the rule of reason to determine
whether an agreement to adhere to exclusive listings or an agreement fixing
associational membership fees is in restraint of trade. In Northern Pacific Railway v. United States71 the Supreme Court categorized as per se agreements those
practices that, because of a lack of any redeeming virtue, are conclusively
presumed unreasonable.72 Generally, per se violations include price fixing and

67. Theatre Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distributing Corp., 346 U.S. 537 (1954).
68. Consent decree, United States v. Prince George's County Bd. of Realtors, Inc., Civil
No. 21545 (D. Md., entered Dec. 28, 1970).
69. 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
70. "Every agreement concerning trade, every regulation of trade, restrains. To bind,
to restrain, is of their very essence. The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition, or whether
it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition. To determine that question the
court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is
applied; its condition before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the
restraint and its effect, actual or probable." Id. at 238.
71. 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
72. "[A]greements or practices which because of their pernicious effect on competition
and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have caused or the
business excuse for their use." Id. at 5.
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boycotts.73 In 1956 the Court stated that it makes no difference whether the
motives of the participants are good or evil; whether the price fixing is accomplished by express contract or some more subtle means; whether the participants have market control; whether the amount of interstate commerce is
large or small; or whether the effect of the agreement is to raise or decrease
4
prices7
Although the existence of an illegal combination or conspiracy must be
proved, the per se rule facilitates proof of commission fixing. Recent federal
actions against real estate boards may lead to the development of guidelines
especially applicable to real estate activities. Meanwhile, the implied illegality
of a failure to negotiate real estate commissions awaits further judicial clarification.
ASSOCIATIONAL RESTRAINT OF TRADE

The efforts by real estate trade associations to establish professional standards, correct trade abuses, and improve the efficiency of the real estate market
benefit the public. Public benefits, however, may be offset by associational
commission fixing, commission-apportionment formulas, discrimination against
nonmembers, and barriers to membership. The decision in Associated Press
v. United States 5 can be analogized to recent federal antitrust actions against
realtors. Associated Press bylaws required members to use AP news regularly
and to furnish all news written by members to AP exclusively. The bylaws
prohibited the sale of AP releases to nonmembers and created membership
barriers for competing nonmembers.76 The Supreme Court, holding that the
bylaws constituted restraints of trade, indicated that one purpose of the
Sherman Act was to prevent associations of independent businesses from reducing the possibility of meaningful competition by nonmembersY7
Where a multiple listing system has achieved its intended success, participation therein may become a sine qua non in real estate sales just as
participation in Associated Press was essential to success in the news business.
The test is whether the multiple listing system is of such economic importance
that exclusion or discriminatory treatment of nonmembers results in a denial
of opportunity to compete effectively on equal terms.7 8

73. Van Cise, The Future of Per Se in Antitrust Law, 50 VA. L. REv. 1165, 1167 (1964).
74. United States v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 351 U.S. 305, 309-10 (1956).
75. 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
76. Id. at 10-11.
77. "The Sherman Act was specifically intended to prohibit independent businesses from
becoming 'associates' in a common plan which is bound to reduce their competitors
opportunity to buy or sell the things in which the groups compete. Victory of a member of
such a combination over its business rivals achieved by such collective means cannot consistently with the Sherman Act or with practical, everyday knowledge be attributed to
individual 'enterprise and sagacity'; such hampering of business rivals can only be attributed
to that which really makes it possible -the collective power of an unlawful combination."
Id. at 15 (emphasis added).
78. Austin, supra note 62, at 1346.
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If an activity is found to violate the Sherman Act the Government may
press criminal charges punishable by a maximum of one year imprisonment
and a fine of 50,000 dollars. T9 Government civil actions, if successful, usually
result in injunctions restraining the defendant from further violations8 0
Further, when the Government is injured by reasons of antitrust violations it
may recover actual damages and the cost of the suit."'
Private remedies include treble damages awarded either to individual
83
82
or members of a class or injunctions restraining further violations.
plaintiffs

If they meet the prerequisites, antitrust actions may be brought as class actions
under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 4 Most consumer
treble-damage actions that have been brought have followed government
prosecutions.8 5
Section 16 of the Clayton Act provides for private action for injunctions
in antitrust actions. 86 The plaintiff must ordinarily show: (1) that the conduct to be enjoined is in furtherance of alleged violations of the antitrust
laws; (2) that there is substantial likelihood the allegations of the complaint
will be sustained; (3) that irreparable harm to the plaintiff will result if the
injunction is denied; and (4) that the harm to the defendant likely to result
if relief is granted does not outweigh the harm to the plaintiff if relief is
denied.8 7 The third requirement has been construed as requiring a showing
that the loss or damage is not capable of definite measurement 8 National

79.

15 U.S.C. §1 (1970).

80. E.g., Consent decree, United States v. Prince George's County Bd. of Realtors, Inc.,
Civil No. 21545 (D. Md., entered Dec. 28, 1970).
81. 15 U.S.C. §15a (1970).
82. Any person injured by an antitrust law violation may recover treble damages and
cost of his suit, including a reasonable fee for his attorney. 15 U.S.C. §15 (1964).
83. 15 U.S.C. §26 (1970).
84. "Under new Rule 23 (a) there are four prerequisites to a class action: (I) the class
is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; (2) there are questions of
fact or law common to the class; (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties
are typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and (4) the representative parties will
fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. Rule 23 (b) provides that a class
action may be brought if the prerequisites of Rule 23 (a) are met and one or more of certain other tests are met, the most important of which is 23 (b) (3) ('the court finds that
the questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any
questions affecting only individual members, and that class action is superior to other
available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.')" S. OPPENHEIM
& G. WESTON, FEDERAL ANTrrgusr LAws 881 (3d ed. 1968).
85. For example, Justice Department actions against antibiotic drug manufacturers
resulted in a proposed $82 million settlement program, while additional proceedings in unsettled cases were being conducted. Scher, Antitrust and Consummerism: What Is It All
About?, 22 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 11, 15-16 (1970).
86. 15 U.S.C. §26 (1970).
87. See McKesson & Robbins, Inc. v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 235 F. Supp. 743, 746 (E.D.
Pa. 1964).
88. Id. at 750.
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Association of Real Estate Boards89 illustrates the interrelationship between
civil and criminal penalties. In the criminal action the district court entered
judgment of acquittal based upon application of reasonable construction of
the Act and a failure to find an unreasonable restraint of trade.90 A year later
in the parallel civil case 9 ' the Attorney General sought to enjoin violations of
section 8 of the Sherman Act.9 2 Once again, the court, finding no discernible
reason why a real estate board may not regulate commissions for services as
a labor union regulates wages, ruled in favor of the defendant, stating that
personal services are not commodities or articles of trade within the meaning
of the Sherman Act.93 The court added that a different problem might be
presented if fixed rates were unreasonable or oppressive or if they substantially reduced competition. 94 On appeal the Supreme Court reversed the district court's decision and held that the business of a real estate agent is included in the word "trade" within the meaning of section 3 of the Act. 95
Relying on the difference in the quantum of proof required in civil and
criminal cases, the Court rejected a contention that the criminal acquittal
should apply in the civil case under the doctrine of res judicata. 96 In selecting
remedies the Department of Justice is guided by the principle that price
97
fixing generally carries the highest priority for criminal prosecution.
PrivateFederalAntitrust ClassActions
Three months after the Justice Department filed the complaint in United
States v. Los Angeles Realty Board,8 private parties filed a class action on behalf of all persons who sold or attempted to sell property in Los Angeles
County within the four-year period preceding the filing.99 The plaintiff class
included, in addition to those who sold property, those persons who were
unable to sell property because the alleged artificially stabilized commissions
when added to the fair market values of the property precluded its sale. Moreover, the plaintiffs maintained that defendants refused to list property through
multiple listing systems unless prospective sellers agreed to pay the artificially
inflated rates. The action was brought against named realty boards and member realtors and all brokers, as a class, who had been board members within
the four-year perior preceding the filing. The complaint did not indicate the
89. 80 F. Supp. 350 (D.D.C. 1948).
90. Id. at 353.
91. United States v. National Ass'n of Real Estate Bds., 84 F. Supp. 802 (D.D.C. 1949).
92. 15 U.S.C. §3 (1970).
93. United States v. National Ass'n of Real Estate Bds., 84 F. Supp. 802, 803-04 (D.D.C.
1949).
94. Id. at 804.
95. United States v. National Ass'n of Real Estate Bds., 339 U.S. 485, 489-92 (1950).
96. Id. at 492-94.
97.

Kramer, Criminal Prosecutions for Violations of the Sherman Act: In Search of a

Policy, 48 GEo. L. J. 530 (1960).
98. Civil No. 70-2855-CC (C.D. Cal., filed Dec. 18, 1970).
99. Amended Complaint, Kline v. Coldwell, Banker & Co., Realtors, Civil No. 70-2127WPG (C.D. Cal., filed March 18, 1971).
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theories or bases for computation of damages, but sought $750 million as
treble damages plus attorneys' fees and plaintiffs' costs. The complaint alleged
the fixing of commission rates and adherence to exclusive multiple listings
in violation of the Sherman Act' 0 0 and the California Cartright Act.' 0 '
The Clayton Act provides that a final judgment in any civil or criminal
proceeding brought by the United States determining that a defendant has
violated the antitrust laws shall be prima fade evidence against him in a subsequent action by any other party, as to all matters for which said judgment
would be an estoppel as between the parties.102 Consent decrees, however, are
excepted from this proviso. °0 Undoubtedly, this exception is a powerful in0
centive for defendants to accept consent decrees.: 4
FLORIDA ANTITRUST LAW

Florida real estate brokers and salesmen are subject not only to federal
antitrust laws but also to similar state laws. Chapter 542, Florida Statutes, in
language somewhat similar to the Sherman Act, defines a trust as a combination of persons, corporations, or associations for any of certain specified
purposes. Section 542.01 proscribes the creation of restrictions in the free pursuit of any business authorized by state law and also proscribes the fixing of
prices of any commodity, 0 5 including a service. 0 6
The Florida Department of Legal Affairs or any Florida state attorney
may institute proceedings for the dissolution of any corporation violating
the statute.'0 7 Further, a fine of not less than fifty dollars nor more than 5,000
dollars and imprisonment in the penitentiary from one to ten years is prescribed as punishment for any person aiding or advising in the creation of
such combination. 08 There is, however, no provision in the Florida act comparable to that of the Clayton Act, 0 9 allowing a private suitor to recover
treble damages.
In one of the few test cases involving the Florida statute the Florida supreme court held the act valid, but not applicable to fire insurance companies
agreeing upon classifications of fire hazards for insurance contracts and ratemaking purposes."10 The paucity of prosecutions under Florida antitrust law
100. 15 U.S.C. §1 (1970).
101. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§16720, 16726 (West 1964).
102. 15 U.S.C. §16(a) (1970).
103. ld.
104. Two-thirds of federal civil antitrust actions instituted by the Government have
resulted in consent decrees, S. OPPENHmIM & G. WSTON, FEDERAL ANTrrRuST LAws 844 (3d
ed. 1968).
105. FLA. STAT. §542.01 (1969).
106. Id.
107. FLA. STAT. §542.03 (1969).
108. FLA. STAT. §542.05(5)(a) (1969). The statute further states: "Each day during
a violation of this provision shall constitute a separate offense." The severity of the prescribed punishment may inhibit its enforcement.
109. 15 U.S.C. §15 (1970).
110. Brock v. Hardie, 114 Fla. 670, 154 So. 690 (1934).
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is matched by similar inactivity in other states.1 , Commonly mentioned
reasons for this lack of enforcement indude:"1 2 (1) the absence of state jurisdiction because of federal preemption; (2) a belief that federal law suffices;
(3) the lack of good state enforcement machinery; and (4) a lack of desire for
local enforcement.
Despite an alleged lack of state jurisdiction the Supreme Court decided in
Standard Oil Co. of Kentucky v. Tennessee"3 that interstate commerce is
not necessarily unlawfully regulated when a state enforces its antitrust laws.
This is in accord with exhortations by federal antitrust officials for more
vigorous application of state laws." 4 Although the Supreme Court has not
determined whether activities of real estate brokers, salesmen, and associations
are within the federal commerce power, Florida law is applicable to such
activities." 5 Unless the state antitrust law is repealed, anyone, including a
realtor, violating it does so at the risk of stiff penal and monetary sanctions.
ALTERNATIVES TO PRESENT

PRAcncEs

BY REALTORS' ASSOCIATIONS AND .MEMBERS

The panoply of remedies available to federal and state authorities, as well
as private parties, combined with recent antitrust actions brought against real
estate trade associations and members raises the question of what action realtors should take. The possibilities available to Florida realtors' associations and
members include: (1) adherence to present practices, (2) pro forma compliance
with terms of the recent consent decree in Prince George's County Board of
Realtors to the extent of eliminating overt adverse evidence, (3) advocation
of remedial legislation, and (4) full voluntary compliance.
Adherence to PresentPractices
The effectiveness of a decision to take no action until compliance is
judicially required depends upon the anticipated frequency and severity of
antitrust actions in the real estate area. More than twenty years passed between the Supreme Court's decision in National Association of Real Estate
Boards and the consent decree in Prince George's County Board of Realtors,
Inc. In the former case evidence indicated, and in the latter the complaint
alleged, adherence by board members to recommended rate schedules published by the boards. In both cases the decrees enjoin the boards from fixing
commission rates. However, the injunctions impair the status of the
affected boards, in comparison with other boards, only to the extent that
retained jurisdiction and judicial enforcement require compliance. A Justice
111.

Rahl, Toward a Worthwhile State Antitrust Policy, 39 TXAs L. Rv. 753 (1961).

112. Id. at 756.
113. 217 U.S. 413 (1910).
114. Assistant Attorney General Robert A. Bicks (Head of Antitrust Division, Dep't of
Justice) and Earl W. Kinter (Chairman, FTC) at Antitrust Conference sponsored by Consumer Council Division, Office of the Massachusetts Attorney General, Boston, Mass., Oct.
6, 1960, cited in Rahl, supra note 111.
115. See Standard Oil Co. of Ky. v, Tennessee, 217 U.S, 413 (1910).
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Department spokesman recently stated that there have been no court enforcement proceedings against the Washington Board of Realtors, the defendant enjoined in National Association of Real Estate Boards.11 6 Other
sources1 7 indicate that the going commission rates are six per cent on developed residential properties and that these rates are very similar in the
20
9
District of Columbia,"" Maryland," and Virginia.
While government enforcement of federal antitrust law has been infrequent and gentle, comparable enforcement of Florida state antitrust law in
real estate activities has been nonexistent. Since the Supreme Court's decision
in National Association of Real Estate Boards121 the Justice Department has
filed no complaints against the national or state associations. This has spread
the risk over many local boards and realtors and minimized apprehension. The
low frequency of government antitrust actions against real estate activities, the
minimal sanctions applied thus far, and the large number of realtors subject
to selective prosecution make the likelihood of prosecution small and, therefore, substantial changes in real estate activities unlikely.
Pro Forma Compliance
The record of past enforcement and the low probability of sanctions
against any one of a large number of realtors tends to support the status quo
in real estate activities. There is, nevertheless, a sound argument for pro
forma compliance. The government's actions in both National Association of
Real Estate Boards and Prince George's County Board of Realtors relied substantially upon the evidence of published commission rate schedules as a
basis for the inference of the existence of a conspiracy. It is not surprising,
therefore, that some realtors consider it prudent to preclude the availability of
such circumstantial evidence for any future litigation. The Legal Research
116. Letter from Richard W. McLaren, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division,
United States Dep't of Justice, Washington, D.C. to University of Florida Law Review,
May 12, 1971.
117. "[W]e are informed by local realtors that the going commission rates are 6% on
developed residential properties .... These rates are very similar in all three nearby areasD.C., Maryland, and Virginia. We are told that the D.C. and Prince George's County rates
are 'negotiable,' but the realtor normally fills in those commission rates when writing up
the contract and negotiates only if the seller raises the question. Few commissions are
actually negotiated. An indication of the effect of the 1950 decision is that the Washington
Board of Realtors will not disclose or discuss the average or going rates being charged by
its members." Letter from The Kiplinger Washington Editors, Washington, D.C. to University of Florida Law Review, May 14, 1971; Roberts, A Home-Grown Author and Pureof-Heart Pranking,The National Observer, July 26, 1971, at 11, cols. 4-5.
118. Rates in the District of Columbia are subject to an injunction against price fixing.
United States v. National Ass'n of Real Estate Bds., 339 U.S. 485 (1950).
119. Rates in Prince George's County, Md., adjacent to the metropolitan area of Washington, D.C., are subject to an injunction against price fixing. Consent decree, United States
v. Prince George's County Bd. of Realtors, Inc., Civil No. 21545 (D. Md., entered Dec. 28,

1970).
120. The Attorney General has filed no complaints against Virginia realtors associations.
121. United States v. National Ass'n of Real Estate Bds., 339 U.S. 485 (1950).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1972

15

1972]

Florida
Law Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 2 [1972], Art. 6
ANTITRUST LAW

Institute, Inc. commenting on Prince George's County Board of Realtors has
22
noted:
In all the forms that previously contained a set commission rate the
board was instructed to remove the rate. In what seems to be punishment action the court demanded that the board include in all contracts
and other forms a provision stating that commission rates shall be
negotiable between the broker and his client.
WHAT TO DO: Never use any printed forms that have the commission rate printed therein. The Sherman Act prohibits any organization from setting fees or attempting to enforce fees on real estate
brokers.
The advisory service's categorization of the consent decree's "demand" of
a statement that rates shall be negotiable as a form of punishment, its simple
advice never to use printed forms containing commission rates, and its accompanying factual statement that the Sherman Act prohibits any organization from setting fees exemplifies the chasm between accepted real estate practice and the antitrust laws. The recently revised Charter and Bylaws of the
1 28
Florida Association of Realtors are silent on the subject of commission rates.
Despite the gap between trade practice and antitrust law it is probable,
pending future judicial decisions, that realtors will eliminate printed schedules
and contracts containing fixed commission rates.
Remedial Legislation
A third course of action available to Florida realtor associations and members is remedial legislation exempting all or selected aspects of real estate
activities from operation of federal or Florida antitrust laws. In the wake of a
judicial determination that insurance, including collaboration in the setting
of insurance rates, is interstate commerce, 124 Congress in 1945 passed the
McCarran Act 25 providing that "the Sherman Act ... shall be applicable to
the business of insurance to the extent that such business is not regulated by
State law."'126 The likelihood of similar federal legislation carving out an
antitrust exemption area for real estate activities involves considerations such
as a comparison of real estate to insurance and other exempted areas and an
evaluation of the protection of the consumer under state versus federal control.
Any attempt to secure state legislation carving out an exemption area for
realtors in the Florida antitrust law'1 27 would test current legislative intent
as to Florida's seemingly dormant antitrust powers. Such a confrontation
might close the gap between the law and accepted real estate practices. Alternatively, emphasis on the discrepancy between law and practice might
result in increased efforts by state authorities to enforce the law.
CH INSITuTE, INc., 5 REAL ESTATE LAW BalF CASE No. 3 (1971)
122. LEGAL RES
(emphasis added).
123. Florida Ass'n of Realtors, Charter and Bylaws (rev. Jan. 1971).
124. United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
125. 15 U.S.C. §§1011-15 (1964).
126. 15 U.S.C. §1012 (1970).
127. FLA. STAT. ch. 542 (1970).
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Voluntary Compliance
A fourth approach for Florida realtors would be compliance with the
philosophy and intent of the antitrust laws, as expressed in Northern Pacific
128
Railway v. United States:
The Sherman Act... rests on the premise that the unrestrained interaction of competitive forces will yield the best allocation of our economic resources, the lowest prices, the highest quality and the greatest
material progress, while at the same time providing an environment conducive to the preservation of our democratic political and social institutions.
The philosophy of the Florida antitrust law, patterned after the Sherman
Act, is undoubtedly similar. The key question is: To what extent is this philosophy the philosophy of the citizen, the government, and, with respect to
voluntary compliance, the realtor?
If the philosophy underlying the Prince George's County Board of Realtors decree is extended to Florida, it would require Florida realtors and their
clients to negotiate commission rates and, possibly, negotiate apportionment
of commissions between the listing and the selling realtor. 129 Similarly, it
would preclude boycotting or otherwise refusing to do business with nonmember agents and require association membership fees commensurate with
associational benefits. The ultimate economic and social effects of such changes
in real estate practices are difficult to foresee. To the extent that the philosophy of the Sherman Act is applied to real estate activities, the over-all
results would be economically and socially beneficial to the public. It is unclear whether such changes would reward the more efficient realtor at the
expense of his less efficient competitor. Whether commission rates, as well as
the size of agencies, would generally increase or diminish could only be determined by experience. However, such changes would undoubtedly alter the
stability of the present real estate trade. Although voluntary compliance by
realtors may appear attractive from an objective viewpoint, it is unlikely that
realtors will voluntarily abandon the principles on which their associations
have achieved stability and prosperity.
ALTERNATIVES FOR REAL ESTATE SELLERS AND BUYERS

Just as real estate associations and members must choose among available courses of action, so must the real estate client. Florida real estate sellers
and buyers may elect to accept the customary rates, patronize only brokers

128. 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958).
129. If the listing agent's commission, a percentage of the sales price, is compensation
for the agent's discovery of a seller, good faith negotiations will doubtless create questions
of whether a willing seller, who on his own initiative contacts an agent, or a multiple
listing system, should pay any commission for being discovered as a seller.
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charging a negotiable rate, demand antitrust law enforcement, litigate their
grievances, or bypass realtors entirely.
Florida real estate buyers, sellers, lessors, and lessees have no organizations
to offset the political and economic strength of realtor trade associations. Consequently, attitudes and actions of realtors' clients are individualistic. Many
clients patronize multiple listing system members, in spite of fixed commission
rates, because of the systems' proven performance. Whether from ignorance of
their rights or broker intransigence, few clients negotiate commissions even
with trade association nonmembers. 130
Lack of knowledge of the law and the sporadic nature of the individual's
personal interest in real estate transactions have combined to minimize any
effective popular demand for antitrust enforcement. Moreover, judicial precedents motivating the realtor's client to litigate his grievances are few.131
A final alternative open to the buyer or seller of realty is direct dealing
between buyers and sellers.132 While the extent of direct dealing is unknown,
it represents an increasingly attractive alternative as commissions increase.
However, many real estate sellers are hesitant to operate in an area in which
they have little knowledge and are unwilling to sacrifice the proven effectiveness of multiple listing systems. Until sellers and buyers of real estate are
better informed and organized, it is unlikely that there will be any changes
in the pattern of their real estate activities. Future judicial decisions, legislative action, and consumer oriented publicity could, however, alter client attitudes and tactics.
CONCLUSION

Since the Supreme Court determined in 1950 that real estate sales and
133
management activities constitute a trade for purposes of the antitrust laws,
lower federal decisions have extended the federal commerce power to include
such real estate activities. 3 4 A final determination on this extension of the
commerce power awaits an appeal from a decision on facts similar to those
in Prince George's County Board of Realtors. 35 Notwithstanding the unsettled

Letter, supra note 117.
131. But see Bratcher v. Akron Area Bd. of Realtors, 381 F.2d 723 (6th Cir. 1967);
Grillo v. Board of Realtors, 91 N.J. Super. 202, 219 A.2d 635 (Super. Ct. 1966). See also
Amended complaint, Kline v. Coldwell, Banker & Co. Realtors, Civil No. 70-2127-WPG
(C.D. Cal., filed March 18, 1971).
132. "A Washington area firm ... will permit you to sell your house yourself, but will
take care of placing the financing and other paper work for a charge of only 2 per cent ....
Selling a house is not usually such a chore that the owner can't manage it himself ....
By
separating the selling of the house from the paper work, the real estate agent saves a lot
of his time and still makes a good fee, while the owner winds up by saving many hundreds
of dollars." Roberts, supra note 117.
133. United States v. National Ass'n of Real Estate Bds., 339 U.S. 485 (1950). See
text accompanying notes 89-97 supra.
134. E.g., Consent decree, United States v. Prince George's County Bd. of Realtors,
Inc., Civil No. 21545 (D. Md., entered Dec. 28, 1970).
135. Complaint, United States v. Atlanta Real Estate Bd., Civil No. 14744 (N.D. Ga.,
130.
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nature of the application of the commerce clause to the activities of realtors,
several points relating to the practices of Florida realtors are clearly established:
(1) published rate schedules and printed contract forms including
commission rates may be used as evidence of a conspiracy to fix rates;
(2) the boycotting of real estate trade association nonmembers is no
longer acceptable;
(3) exorbitant initiation fees for membership in real estate associations
are proscribed.
In the face of such prohibitions, realtors must reexamine their present
practices. The laxity of federal and state antitrust law enforcement against
realtors invites deferral of compliance until judicially required.
The gap between antitrust law requirements and enforcement presents
realtors a problem of deciding whether to ignore, seek modification of, or
comply with principles proscribing fixed commission rates and fixed commission apportionment formulas. The current antitrust actions may help to
solve this problem.
JOHN

D.

MCELHENY

filed Feb. 17, 1971); Complaint, United States v. Los Angeles Realty Bd., Civil No. 70-2855CC (C.D. Cal., filed Dec. 18, 1970); Complaint, United States v. Long Island Bd. of Realtors,
Inc., Civil No. 70 C 1418 (E.D.N.Y., filed Nov. 17, 1970); Complaint, United States v.
Cleveland Real Estate Bd., Civil No. C 70.731 (N.D. Ohio, filed July 29, 1970).
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